In this work, the critical role of noisy feedback in enhancing the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel is established. Unlike previous works, where a noiseless public discussion channel is used for feedback, the feed-forward and feedback signals share the same noisy channel in the present model. Quite interestingly, this noisy feedback model is shown to be more advantageous in the current setting.
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of secure communication from an information theoretic perspective was pioneered by Shannon [1] . In Shannon's model, both the sender and the destination possess a common secret key K, which is unknown to the wiretapper, and use this key to encrypt and decrypt the message implying that the signal Z received by the wiretapper does not provide any additional information about the source message M. Under this model, he proved the pessimistic result that the achievability of perfect secrecy requires the entropy of the shared private key K to be at least equal to the entropy of the message itself (i.e., H(K) ≥ H(M) for perfect secrecy). Clearly, the distribution of the secret key under this model is challenging.
In a pioneering work [2] , Wyner introduced the wiretap channel and established the possibility of creating an almost perfectly secure source-destination link without relying on private (secret) keys. In the wiretap channel, both the wiretapper and destination observe the source encoded message through noisy channels. Similar to Shannon's model, the wiretapper is assumed to have unlimited computational resources. Wyner showed that when the source-wiretapper channel is a degraded version of the source-destination channel, the source can send perfectly secure 1 messages to the destination at a non-zero rate. The main idea is to hide the information stream in the additional noise impairing the wiretapper by using a stochastic encoder which maps each message to many codewords according to an appropriate probability distribution. This way, one induces maximal equivocation at the wiretapper. By ensuring that the equivocation rate is arbitrarily close to the message rate, one achieves perfect secrecy in the sense that the wiretapper is now limited to learn almost nothing about the source-destination messages from its observations. Follow-up work by Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman has characterized the secrecy capacity of the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) wiretap channel [4] . In a landmark paper, Csiszár and Körner generalized Wyner's approach by considering the transmission of confidential messages over broadcast channels [5] . This work characterized the perfect secrecy capacity of Discrete Memoryless Channels (DMC)s, and showed that the perfect secrecy capacity is positive unless the source-wiretapper channel is less noisy than the source-destination channel (referred to as the main channel in the sequel) 2 .
Positive secrecy capacity is not always possible to achieve in practice. In an attempt to transmit 1 Wyner's notion of per symbol equivocation is weaker than Shannon's notion of perfect secrecy [3] . 2 The source-wiretapper channel is said to be less noisy than the main channel, if for every
, where X is the signal transmitted by the source, and where Y and Z are the received signal at the receiver and the wiretapper respectively.
DRAFT messages securely in these unfavorable scenarios, [6] and [7] considered the wiretap channel with noiseless feedback 3 . They showed that one may leverage the feedback to achieve a positive perfect secrecy rate, even when the feed-forward perfect secrecy capacity is zero. In this model, there exists a separate noiseless public channel, through which the transmitter and receiver can exchange information. The wiretapper is assumed to obtain a perfect copy of the messages transmitted over this public channel. Upper and lower bounds were derived for the perfect secrecy capacity with noiseless feedback in [6] , [7] . In several cases, as discussed in detail in the sequel, these bounds coincide. But, in general, the perfect secrecy capacity with noiseless feedback remains unknown. Along the same line, [8] established the critical role of a trusted/untrusted helper in enhancing the secret key capacity of public discussion algorithms. The multi-terminal generalization of the basic set-up of [6] , [7] was studied in [9] . Finally, in [10] - [12] , the public discussion paradigm was extended to handle the existence of active adversaries.
Our work represents a marked departure from the public discussion paradigm. In our model, we do not assume the existence of a separate noiseless feedback channel. Instead, the feedback signal from the destination, which is allowed to depend on the signal received so far, is transmitted over the same noisy channel used by the source. Based on the noisy feedback signal, the source can then causally adapt its transmission scheme, hoping to increase the perfect secrecy rate. The wiretapper receives a mixture of the signal from the source and the feedback signal from the destination. Quite interestingly, we show that in the modulo-additive DMC with a full-duplex destination, the perfect secrecy capacity with noisy feedback equals the capacity of the main channel in the absence of the wiretapper. Furthermore, the capacity is achieved with a simple scheme where the source ignores the feedback signal and the destination feeds back randomly generated symbols from a certain alphabet set. This feedback signal plays the role of a private key, known only by the destination, and encryption is performed by the modulo-additive channel.
The more challenging scenario with a half-duplex destination, which cannot transmit and receive simultaneously, is considered next. Here, the active transmission periods by the destination will introduce erasures in the feed-forward source-destination channel. In this setting, we propose a novel feedback scheme that achieves a positive perfect secrecy rate for any non-trivial channel distribution. The feedback signal in our approach acts as a private destination only key which 3 The authors also considered a more general secret sharing problem.
DRAFT strikes the optimal tradeoff between introducing erasures at the destination and errors at the wiretapper. Finally, the proposed scheme is extended to the continuous modulo-Λ lattice channel where it is shown to achieve the capacity of the main channel. Overall, our work proposes a novel approach for encryption where 1) the feedback signal is used as a private key known only to the destination and 2) the encryption is performed by exploiting the modulo-additive property of the channel. This encryption approach is shown to be significantly superior to the classical public discussion paradigm.
Recently, there has been a resurgent interest in studying secure communications from information theoretic perspective under various scenarios. The point-to-point fading eavesdropper channel was considered in [13] - [18] under different assumptions on the delay constraints and the available transmitter Channel State Information (CSI). In [19] - [22] , the information theoretic limits of secure communications over multiple access channels were explored. The relay channel with confidential messages, where the relay acts both as a wiretapper and a helper, was studied in [23] , [24] . In [25] , the interference channel with confidential messages was studied. In [26] , the four terminal relay-eavesdropper channel was introduced and analyzed. The wiretap channel with side information was studied in [27] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the system model and our notation. Section III describes and analyzes the proposed feedback scheme which achieves the capacity of the full duplex modulo-additive DMC. Taking the Binary Symmetric Channel (BSC) as an example, we then compare the performance of the proposed scheme with the public discussion approach. The half-duplex scenario is studied in Section IV. In Section V, we extend our results to the modulo-Λ lattice channel. Finally, Section VI offers some concluding remarks and outlines possible venues for future research.
II. THE MODULO-ADDITIVE DISCRETE MEMORYLESS CHANNEL
Throughout the sequel, the upper-case letter X will denote a random variable, a lower-case letter x will denote a realization of the random variable, a calligraphic letter X will denote a finite alphabet set and a boldface letter x will denote a vector. Furthermore, we let [x] + = max{0, x}.
Without feedback, our modulo-additive discrete memoryless wiretap channel is described by the DRAFT following relations at time i
where y(i) is the received symbol at the destination, z(i) is the received symbol at the wiretapper,
x(i) is the channel input, n 1 (i) and n 2 (i) are the noise samples at the destination and wiretapper, respectively. Here N 1 and N 2 are allowed to be correlated, while each process is assumed to be individually drawn from an identically and independently distributed source. Also we
with finite alphabet sizes |X |, |Y|, |Z| respectively. Here '+' is understood to be modulo addition with respect to the corresponding alphabet size, i.e.,
mod |Z| with addition in the real field.
In this paper, we focus on the wiretap channel with noisy feedback. More specifically, at time i the destination sends the causal feedback signal X 1 (i) over the same noisy channel used for feed-forward transmission, i.e., we do not assume the existence of a separate noiseless feedback channel. The causal feedback signal is allowed to depend on the received signal so far
, where Ψ can be any (possibly stochastic) function. In general, we allow the destination to choose the alphabet of the feedback signal X 1 and the corresponding size |X 1 |.
With this noisy feedback from the destination, the received signal at the source, wiretapper and destination are
and to a codeword x ∈ X n with
2) a stochastic feedback encoder Ψ at the destination that maps the received signal into X 1 (i) with x 1 (i) = Ψ(y i−1 ) and 3) a decoding function at the destination d: Y n → W. The average error probability of the (M, n) code is
The equivocation rate at the wiretapper is defined as
We are interested in perfectly secure transmission rates defined as follows.
Definition 1:
A secrecy rate R f is said to be achievable over the wiretap channel with noisy feedback if for any ǫ > 0, there exists a sequence of codes (M, n) such that for any n ≥ n(ǫ),
we have
Definition 2: The secrecy capacity with noisy feedback C f s is the maximum rate at which messages can be sent to the destination with perfect secrecy; i.e.
Note that in our model, the wiretapper is assumed to have unlimited computation resources and to know the coding scheme of the source and the feedback function Ψ used by the destination.
We believe that our feedback model captures realistic scenarios where the terminals exchange information over noisy channels.
III. THE WIRETAP CHANNEL WITH FULL-DUPLEX FEEDBACK

A. Known Results
The secrecy capacity of the wiretap DMC without feedback C s was characterized in [5] .
Specializing to our modulo-additive channel, one obtains
DRAFT The wiretap DMC with public discussion was introduced and analyzed in [6] , [7] . More specifically, these papers considered a more general model in which all the nodes observe correlated variables 4 , and there exists an extra noiseless public channel with infinite capacity, through which both the source and the destination can send information. Combining the correlated variables and the publicly discussed messages, the source and the destination generate a key about which the wiretap only has negligible information. Please refer to [7] for rigorous definitions of these notions. Since the public discussion channel is noiseless, the wiretapper is assumed to observe a noiseless version of the information transmitted over it. It is worth noting that some of the schemes proposed in [6] , [7] manage only to generate an identical secret key at both the source and destination. The source may then need to encrypt its message using the one-time pad scheme which reduces the effective source-destination information rate. Thus, the effective secrecy rate that could be used to transmit information from the source to the destination may be less than the results reported in [6] , [7] . Nevertheless, we use these results for comparison purposes (which is generous to the public discussion paradigm). The following theorem gives upper and lower bounds on the secret key capacity of the public discussion paradigm C p s . Theorem 3 ( [6] , [7] ): The secret key capacity of the public discussion approach satisfies the following conditions:
Proof: Please refer to [6] , [7] .
These bounds are known to be tight in the following cases [6] , [7] . 1) P Y Z|X = P Y |X P Z|X , i.e., the main channel and the source-wiretapper channel are independent; in this case
2) P XZ|Y = P X|Y P Z|Y , i.e., X → Y → Z forms a Markov chain, and hence the sourcewiretapper channel is a degraded version of the main channel. In this case
This is also the secrecy capacity of the degraded wiretap channel without feedback. Hence public discussion does not increase the secrecy capacity for the degraded wiretap channel.
3) P XY |Z = P X|Z P Y |Z , i.e., X → Z → Y , so that the main channel is a degraded version of the wiretap channel. In this case
Again, public discussion does not help in this scenario.
B. The Main Result
Before presenting the main theorem, we present the crypto lemma which will be intensively used later. [28] ): Let G be a compact abelian group with group operation '+', and let Y = X + X 1 , where X and X 1 are random variables over G and X 1 is independent of X and uniform over G. Then Y is independent of X and uniform over G.
Lemma 4 (Crypto Lemma
Proof: Please refer to [28] .
The following theorem characterizes the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with noisy feedback. Moreover, achievability is established through a novel encryption scheme that exploits the modulo-additive structure of the channel and uses a private key known only to the destination.
Theorem 5:
The secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless modulo-additive wiretap channel with noisy feedback is
where C is the capacity of the main channel in the absence of the wiretapper.
Proof:
there exists a coding scheme that satisfies (5)- (7) for R f }.
Also, let R = {R : there exists a coding scheme that satisfies (5)- (6) for R}.
Obviously R f ⊆ R, since we are dropping off the equivocation condition (7), i.e., we are ignoring the wiretapper. Hence we have C f s = sup R f ≤ sup R. It is clear that R is the set of reliable transmission rate of an ordinary DMC channel with feedback. It is well known that feedback does not increase the capacity of discrete memoryless channels, hence we have
2. Achievability.
For any given input probability mass function p(x), we use the following scheme.
1) Coding at the source.
The source ignores the feedback signal and uses a channel coding scheme for the ordinary channel without wiretapper. More specifically, the source generates M = 2 R f length-n codewords x with probability
When the source needs to send message w ∈ W, it sends the corresponding codeword x(w).
2) Feedback at the destination.
The destination sets X 1 = Z, and at any time i sets x 1 (i) = a, a ∈ {0, · · · , |Z| − 1} with probability 1/|Z|. Hence x 1 is uniformly distributed over Z n .
3) Decoding at the destination.
After receiving y, the destination setsŷ = y − x 1 , here '−' is understood to be a component-wise modulo |Y| operation. It is easy to see thatŷ = x + n 1 . The destination then claims thatŵ was sent, if (ŷ, x(ŵ)) are jointly typical. For any given ǫ > 0, the probability thatŵ = w goes to zero, if R f = I(X;Ŷ ) − ǫ = I(X; Y |X 1 ) − ǫ and n is large enough. The channel X →Ŷ is equivalent to the main channel without feedback. Hence as long as R f < C, there exists a code with sufficient code-length such that P n e ≤ ǫ for any ǫ > 0.
4) Equivocation at the wiretapper.
The wiretapper will receive
and x 1 is uniformly distributed over Z n and is independent with x. Based on the crypto lemma, for any given x, x+X 1 is uniformly distributed over Z n , and hence z is uniformly distributed over Z n for any transmitted codeword x and noise realization n 2 . Moreover Z is independent with X, thus
Hence we have I(W ; Z) ≤ I(X; Z) = 0, thus
and we achieve perfect secrecy.
This completes the proof.
The following observations are now in order.
1) Our scheme achieves I(W ; Z) = 0. This implies perfect secrecy in the strong sense of Shannon [1] as opposed to Wyner's notion of perfect secrecy [2] , which has been pointed out to be insufficient for certain encryption applications [3] .
2) The enabling observation behind our achievability scheme is that, by judiciously exploiting the modulo-additive structure of the channel, one can render the channel output at the wiretapper independent from the codeword transmitted by the source. Here, the feedback signal x 1 serves as a private key and the encryption operation is carried out by the channel.
Instead of requiring both the source and destination to know a common encryption key, we show that only the destination needs to know the encryption key, hence eliminating the burden of secret key distribution.
3) Remarkably, the secrecy capacity with noisy feedback is shown to be larger than the secret key capacity of public discussion schemes. This point will be further illustrated by the binary symmetric channel example discussed next. This presents a marked departure from the conventional wisdom, inspired by the data processing inequality, which suggests the superiority of noiseless feedback. This result is due to the fact that the noiseless feedback signal is also available to the wiretapper, while in the proposed noisy feedback scheme neither the source nor the wiretapper knows the feedback signal perfectly. In fact, the source in our scheme ignores the feedback signal, which is used primarily to confuse the wiretapper.
DRAFT 4) Our result shows that complicated feedback functions Ψ are not needed to achieve optimal performance in this setting (i.e., a random number generator suffices). Also, the alphabet size of the feedback signal can be set equal to the alphabet size of the wiretapper channel and the coding scheme used by the source is the same as the one used in the absence of the wiretapper. To illustrate the idea of encryption over the channel, we consider in some details the wiretap BSC shown in Figure 1 , where X = Y = Z = {0, 1}, Pr{n 1 = 1} = ǫ and Pr{n 2 = 1} = δ.
C. The Binary Symmetric Channel Example
The secrecy capacity of this channel without feedback is known to be [6]
with H(x) = −x log x − (1 − x) log(1 − x). We differentiate between the following special cases.
In this case, both the main channel and wiretap channel are noiseless, hence
Also we have we obtain an equivalent wiretap BSC with parameters ǫ ′ = 0, δ ′ = 1/2 resulting in
2) 0 < δ < ǫ < 1/2, N 1 and N 2 are independent.
Since δ < ǫ, we have
Also, N 1 and N 2 are independent, so P Y Z|X = P Y |X P Z|X . Then from (10), one can easily
Our feedback scheme, on the other hand, achieves
Since H(ǫ + δ − 2ǫδ) ≤ 1, we have C In this case, the source-wiretapper channel is a degraded version of the main channel as shown in Figure 3 ; X → Y → Z, so from (11) In this case
The value of C p s is unknown in this case but can be bounded by
In summary, the secrecy capacity with noisy feedback is always larger than or equal to that of the public discussion paradigm when the underlying wiretap channel is a BSC. More strongly, the gain offered by the noisy feedback approach, over the public discussion paradigm, is rather significant in many relevant special cases.
IV. EVEN HALF-DUPLEX FEEDBACK IS SUFFICIENT
It is reasonable to argue against the practicality of the full duplex assumption adopted in the previous section. For example, in the wireless setting, nodes may not be able to transmit and receive with the same degree of freedom due to the large difference between the power levels of the transmit and receive chains. This motivates extending our results to the half duplex wiretap channel where the terminals can either transmit or receive but never both at the same time. Under DRAFT this situation, if the destination wishes to feed back at time i, it loses the opportunity to receive the i th symbol transmitted by the source, which effectively results in an erasure (assuming that the source is unaware of the destination decision). The proper feedback strategy must, therefore, strike a balance between confusing the wiretapper and degrading the source-destination link. In order to simplify the following presentation, we first focus on the wiretap BSC. The extension to arbitrary modulo-additive channels is briefly outlined afterwards.
In the full-duplex case, at any time i, the optimal scheme is to let the destination send x 1 (i), which equals 0 or 1 with probability 1/2 respectively. But in the half-duplex case, if the destination always keeps sending, it does not have a chance to receive information from the source, and hence, the achievable secrecy rate is zero. This problem, however, can be solved by observing that if at time i, x 1 (i) = 0, the signal the wiretapper receives, i.e.,
is the same as in the case in which the destination does not transmit. The only crucial difference in this case is that the wiretapper does not know whether the feedback has taken place or not, since x 1 (i) can be randomly generated at the destination and kept private.
The previous discussion inspires the following feedback scheme for the half-duplex channel.
The destination first fixes a faction 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 which is revealed to both the source and wiretapper.
At time i, the destination randomly generates x 1 (i) = 1 with probability t and x 1 (i) = 0 with probability 1 − t. If x 1 (i) = 1, the destination sends x 1 (i) over the channel, which causes an erasure at the destination and a potential error at the wiretapper. On the other hand, when x 1 (i) = 0, the destination does not send a feedback signal and spends the time on receiving from the channel. The key to this scheme is that although the source and wiretapper know t, neither is aware of the exact timing of the event x 1 = 1. The source ignores the feedback and keeps sending information. The following result characterizes the achievable secrecy rate with the proposed feedback scheme.
Theorem 6: For a BSC with half-duplex nodes and parameters ǫ and δ, the scheme proposed above achieves
DRAFT Proof: For the main channel, if the destination spends a t fraction of its time on sending, the equivalent main channel is shown in Figure 4 with outputŷ ∈ {0, φ, 1}, where φ represents an erasure. The erasure probability is t. In the remaining 1 − t fraction of the time, the channel is a BSC with parameter ǫ. Hence, the transition matrix of this equivalent channel is
Meanwhile for the wiretapper, the equivalent channel is still a BSC, but with the increased error probabilityδ Hence the original BSC wiretap channel with noisy feedback is equivalent to a new wiretap channel X → (Ŷ , Z) without feedback, and the channel parameters are given as above.
As shown in [5] , for this equivalent wiretap channel the following secrecy rate is achievable for any input distribution P X :
Hence, by using the input distribution Pr{X = 1} = µ, one can see that
is achievable.
In general, one can obtain the optimal values of µ and t by setting the partial derivative of R f , with respect to µ and t to 0, and solving the corresponding equations. Unfortunately, except for some special cases, we do not have a closed form solution for these equations at the moment. Interestingly, using the not necessarily optimal choice of µ = t = 1/2, we obtain DRAFT R f = (1 − H(ǫ))/2 implying that we can achieve a nonzero secrecy rate as long as ǫ = 1/2 irrespective of the wiretapper channel conditions. Hence, even for half-duplex nodes, noisy feedback from the destination allows for transmitting information securely for almost any wiretap BSC. Finally, we compare the performance of different schemes in some special cases of the wiretap BSC.
1) ǫ = δ = 0.
As mentioned above, here we have C s = C p s = 0. It is easy to verify that the optimal choice of µ and t are 1/2, and we thus have
The main channel is a degraded version of the wiretap channel, so
But by setting µ = t = 1/2 in our half-duplex noisy feedback scheme, we obtain R
The extension to the general discrete modulo-additive channel is natural. The destination can set X 1 = Z, and generates x 1 (i) with certain distribution P X 1 . At time i, if the randomly generated x 1 (i) = 0, the destination sends a feedback signal, incurring an erasure to itself. On the other hand, if x 1 (i) = 0, it does not send the feedback signal and spends the time listening to the source. The achievable performance could be calculated based on the equivalent channels as done in the BSC. This scheme guarantees a positive secrecy capacity as seen in the case where P X 1 is chosen to be uniformly distributed over Z. This is because a uniform distribution over Z renders the output at the wiretapper independent from the source input, i.e., I(W ; Z) = 0, while the destination can still spend 1/|Z| part of the time listening to the source. Finding the optimal distribution P X 1 , however, is tedious.
V. THE MODULO-Λ CHANNEL
In this section, we take a step towards extending our approach to continuous valued channels.
In particular, we consider the Modulo-Λ channel [29] - [32] . This choice is motivated by two considerations 1) this channel still enjoys the modulo structure which proved instrumental in deriving our results in the discrete case, and 2) the modulo-Λ channel has been shown to play an important role in achieving the capacity of the Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) channel DRAFT using lattice coding/decoding techniques [31] (in other words, an AWGN source-destination channel can be well approximated by a Modulo-Λ channel). In the following, we show that, similar to the discrete case, noisy feedback can increase the secrecy capacity of the wiretap modulo-Λ channel to that of the main channel capacity in the absence of the wiretapper.
Before proceeding further, we need to introduce few more definitions. An m-dimensional lattice Λ ⊂ R m is a set of points
where G ∈ R m×m denotes the lattice generator matrix. A fundamental region Ω ∈ R m of Λ is a set such that each x ∈ R m can be written uniquely in the form x = λ + e with λ ∈ Λ, e ∈ Ω, and
There are many different choices of the fundamental region, each with the same volume which will be denoted as V (Λ). Given a lattice Λ, a fundamental region Ω of Λ, and a zero-mean white Gaussian noise process with variance σ 2 1 per dimension, the mod-Λ channel is defined as follows [29] . (n ′ ) be the probability density function of N ′ , one can easily verify that [29] 
Denote the differential entropy of the noise term N ′ by h(Λ, σ
We are now ready to prove the following.
Theorem 8:
The secrecy capacity of mod-Λ channel with noisy feedback is
Proof: The proof follows along the same lines as that of Theorem 5. For the converse, (28) was shown to be the capacity of the mod-Λ channel with the absence of the wiretap in [29] , which naturally serves as an upper-bound for the secrecy capacity, as argued in the proof of Theorem 5.
To achieve this secrecy capacity, the source generates length-n codewords x, with the ith element x(i) being chosen uniformly from Ω. Hence each codeword x ∈ Ω n ⊂ R n×m . Now, at time i, the destination generates feedback signals x 1 (i) with uniform distribution over the set Ω, and thus the feedback signal X 1 is uniformly distributed over Ω n . Based on the crypto lemma, for any codeword x and any particular noise realization n 1 , the length-n random variable received at the wiretapper Z = x + X 1 + n 1 mod Λ, is uniformly distributed over Ω n and is independent with X. Hence, we have I(X; Z) = 0.
On the other hand, with X uniformly distributed over Ω n , the mutual information between X and Y given X 1 (the destination knows X 1 ) is 1 n I(X; Y|X 1 ) = log(V (Λ)) − h(Λ, σ 
So, for any ǫ > 0, there exists a code with rate R f = C f − ǫ and I(M; Z) = 0. This completes the achievablity part.
DRAFT
Our result for the modulo-Λ channel sheds some light on the more challenging scenario of the wiretap AWGN channel with feedback. The difference between the two cases results from the modulo restrictions imposed on the destination and wiretapper outputs. The first constraint does not entail any loss of generality due to the optimality of the modulo-Λ approach in the AWGN setting [31] . Relaxing the second constraint, however, poses a challenge because it destroys the modulo structure necessary to hide the information from the wiretapper (i.e., the crypto lemma needs the group structure). In other words, if the wiretapper is not limited by the modulo-operation then it can gain some additional information about the source message from its observations. Therefore, finding the secrecy capacity of the wiretap AWGN channel remains elusive (at the moment, we can only compute achievable rates using Gaussian noise as the feedback signal).
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have obtained the secrecy capacity (or achievable rate) for several instantiations of the wiretap channel with noisy feedback. More specifically, with a full duplex destination, it has been shown that the secrecy capacity of modulo-additive channels is equal to the capacity of the source-destination channel in the absence of the wiretapper. Furthermore, the secrecy capacity is achieved with a simple scheme in which the destination randomly chooses its feedback signal from a certain alphabet set. Interestingly, with a slightly modified feedback scheme, we are able to achieve a positive secrecy rate for the half duplex channel. Overall, our work has revealed a new encryption paradigm that exploits the structure of the wiretap channel and uses a private key known only to the destination. We have shown that this paradigm significantly outperforms the public discussion approach for sharing private keys between the source and destination.
Our results motivate several interesting directions for future research. For example, characterizing the secrecy capacity of arbitrary DMCs (and the AWGN channel) with feedback remains an open problem. From an algorithmic perspective, it is also important to understand how to exploit different channel structures (in addition to the modulo-additive one) for encryption purposes.
Finally, extending our work to multi-user channel (e.g., the relay-eavesdropper channel [26] ) is of definite interest.
DRAFT
